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JEFF CARRUTH*
The following report surveys the significant developments from opinions decided or
reported by federal courts in the United States during 2004 addressing issues of interna-
tional insolvency in general, and in particular practice under § 304 of the United States
Bankruptcy Code.
I. The Context
Section 304 of the Bankruptcy Code allows certain representatives of a debtor involved
in an insolvency proceeding in a foreign state to seek the recognition of such proceeding
in the United States, and thereby apply for injunctive and other relief to protect and extend
the effects of the foreign proceeding.' Practice under § 304 is well established in the United
States. Foreign representatives often succeed in enjoining creditor action, given the breadth
of foreign proceedings that may be recognized and the flexibility afforded to American
courts in fashioning relief under the statute. Section 109 of the Bankruptcy Code also
permits a foreign debtor or the representative of a foreign debtor to commence an original,
plenary proceeding in the United States so long as the debtor has some property in the
United States (see discussion below). 2 The code also permits an involuntary proceeding to
be commenced against a foreign-based debtor.'
The result is that American courts frequently extend authority and cooperation in foreign
insolvency proceedings described, in the literature of international insolvency, under the
rubric of "modified universalism" or "quasi universalism. "4 Modified universalism exists as
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1. 11 U.S.C. § 304(2004).
2. Id. § 109.
3. See id.
4. Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Multinational Enterprises in General Default: Chapter IS, the ALl Principles, and
the EU Insolvency Regulation, 76 Am. BANKR. L. J. 1, 5-10 (2002) (a thorough discussion of the theoretical
differences between territorialism and universalism).
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a construct relative to two different extremes in the concepts of how domestic courts treat
the insolvency of cross-border enterprises. Under the approach often referred to as "ter-
ritorialism," the courts of each state in which a cross-border enterprise has assets assert
jurisdiction over the assets in that state to the exclusion of the jurisdiction or results of
related proceedings in other states.5 Under the approach often referred to as "universalism,"
a court in one state where the cross-border enterprise can establish jurisdiction-presum-
ably the state containing the corporate headquarters or the most assets-asserts authority
over all assets and creditors' claims wherever found. 6 Territorialism is the historical norm
which has eroded over time, and universalism is seen as the ultimate goal of international
cooperation, the extension of comity by domestic courts, and, most ideally, through inter-
national treaties.7 Cases decided in the United States reveal consistently that the current,
practical reality exists somewhere in between with debtors and creditors, depending on the
procedural circumstances, ever seeking to expand the reach of a proceeding commenced in
one state to other states where adverse results are possible.
H. The Decisions
Four separate decisions in 2004 demonstrate the tensions that result when debtors and
creditors seek the intervention of American courts to resolve disputes involving businesses
centered outside of the United States that have sought the protection of U.S. courts during
their restructuring.
A. IN RE AEROVIAS NAcIoNALEs DE COLOMBIA S.A. AVIANCA
The first significant decision, In re Aerovias Nacionales De Colombia S.A. Avianca, involved
the bankruptcy of Columbia's national airline, Avianca. Aerovias illustrates the quest for
universalism and the naturally related questions of jurisdiction and forum selection. Avianca
and its U.S. operating subsidiary filed voluntary Chapter 11 petitions in the Southern Dis-
trict of New York, but commenced no similar or concurrent proceedings in Columbia,
Avianca's "home" jurisdictionY Several creditors filed motions asking the bankruptcy court
to dismiss the Chapter 11 proceeding since Avianca held most of its assets and generated
most of its income outside of the U.S. and had not filed for bankruptcy protection in
Columbia.l °
The bankruptcy court denied the motions to dismiss. The court concluded that Avianca
easily met the test for eligibility to be a debtor under the Bankruptcy Code. Under § 109,
the provision of the Bankruptcy Code that determines who or what may be a "debtor"
eligible to commence a plenary proceeding, a debtor must possess only a minimal amount
of property in the U.S. to allow a bankruptcy court to establish jurisdiction."l Although
most of Avianca's assets were in Columbia, Avianca had twenty-eight employees and con-
5. Id. at 5.
6. Id. at 6.
7. Id. at 8.
8. In re Aerovias Nacionales De Colombia S.A. Avancia, 303 B.R. 1, 3 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003).
9. Id.
10. Id. at 3-4, 7. Settlements ultimately reduced the number of movants seeking dismissal to one.
11. Id. at 8-9.
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tinuing operations in the United States, leased most of its equipment from U.S. lessors,
and owed a significant amount of its overall debt to U.S. creditors. 2
The bankruptcy court also declined to dismiss Avianca's Chapter 11 petitions on the basis
of § 305 of the Bankruptcy Code. Section 305(a)(1) permits a bankruptcy court to dismiss
or suspend a case if such action would benefit the debtor and creditors. 3 The movants failed
to demonstrate that dismissal would benefit Avianca since it was uncertain whether Avianca
could assert jurisdiction over its largest creditors-particularly its equipment lessors-in
Columbia.14 Columbia's counterpart to Chapter 11, which was recently enacted, provided
no mechanism similar to § 365 of the Bankruptcy Code through which Avianca could reject
burdensome equipment leases.'"
Section 305(a)(2) permits a bankruptcy court to dismiss or suspend a case in favor of a
pending foreign proceeding involving the debtor if the factors of § 304(c) are satisfied.16
No grounds existed for relief under § 305(a)(2) in this case since no proceeding had been
commenced in Columbia. 7 Furthermore, in the view of the bankruptcy court, "it would
be unwarranted to impose an obligation on Avianca to file a proceeding in its 'home' court,
or to assume that if such proceeding were filed it would justify suspension or dismissal of
the U.S. case." 8 Avianca had not acted in bad faith or unfairly manipulated where it filed
its Chapter 11 case, the application of the principle of the Bankruptcy Code would not
prejudice the company's creditors, and there was little to no evidence that adverse creditor
action in Columbia dictated the commencement of a proceeding in a jurisdiction other than
Avianca's home jurisdiction. 19 Section 304 likewise failed to impose a duty on Avianca to
commence a primary or plenary proceeding in its home jurisdiction.20
B. IN RE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF MULTICANAL
The financial straits of Argentine cable operator Multicanal, S.A. resulted in a struggle
between a group of dissident note holders seeking protection in the United States from the
largely consensual, pre-packaged reorganization prosecuted in Argentina. The dispute
has, to date, resulted in two reported opinions: In re Board of Directors of Multicanal (Multi-
canal I) and In re Board of Directors of Multicanal (Multicanal 11).21
Multicanal defaulted in 2002 on its bank debt and the payments due under five series of
notes that the company had issued between 1997 and 2001.11 Management negotiated a
financial restructuring with a group of creditors holding approximately 25 percent of the
outstanding notes.23 Although the vast majority of the notes were held by institutional
12. Id. at 3-6.
13. Id. at 9.
14. Id. at 10.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 11.
17. Id. at 12.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 13-14.
20. Id. at 15-16.
21. In re Bd. of Dirs. of Multicanal S.A., 307 B.R. 384 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004) [hereinafter Multicanal fl;
In re Bd. of Dirs. of Multicanal S.A., 314 B.R. 486 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004) [hereinafter Multicanal H1.
22. Id. at 492.
23. Id. at 493.
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investors, approximately 5 percent of the outstanding aggregate principal of the notes was
held by individuals, often referred to as retail investors, in the United States.24Management
solicited acceptance of the restructuring from holders of the notes and commenced an
acuerdo preventivo extrajudicial (APE) proceeding in Argentina.' 5
Multicanal commenced the APE proceeding on December 17, 2003, and a dissenting
note holder (objector) sued in New York two days later to collect the amounts due under
the notes it held.26 Multicanal's board of directors responded by filing a petition under
§ 304 in the Southern District of New York seeking recognition of the APE and to enjoin
the objector from proceeding with the state court litigation.27
The objector first sought to dismiss the ancillary proceeding by establishing the suprem-
acy of the Trust Indenture Act (TIA) over the right of Multicanal's directors to relief under
§ 304.28 The objector asserted that protections found in the TIA required the bankruptcy
court to deny recognition of the APE proceeding. 9 Specifically, the objector maintained
that recognition under § 304 should be denied because the APE proceeding violated TIA
provisions requiring the consent of note holders before their interests could be impaired
or affected in any way.30 Even though the note holders conceded that their rights could be
impaired in a U.S. proceeding notwithstanding the TIA, they contended that the bank-
ruptcy court must require that a foreign insolvency proceeding provide protections identical
to those in an original Title 11 proceeding before granting § 304 recognition.3'
The bankruptcy court rejected the objector's position. From the seminal decision of
Canada Southern Railway Co. v. Gebbard,32 decided in 1883, to recent § 304 practice under
Cunard Steamship. Co. v. Salen Reefer Services AB,3" American courts have granted comity to
foreign insolvency proceedings, which might produce results contrary to U.S. law.34 The
foreign proceeding need not be identical either in procedure or result to gain recognition."
The objector read the protection of the TIA too broadly in the eyes of the bankruptcy
court. 36 The central purpose of the relevant TIA provisions was to prevent one group of
bondholders (typically insiders of a debtor) from agreeing to amend an indenture to the
detriment of other holders and to preserve the right of a holder to take direct action to
enforce the debt upon default.37 Although the TIA and § 304 serve different aims, the legal
texts could be read together, yet the bankruptcy court refused to condition ancillary relief
24. Id. at 493-94.
25. Id. at 493. The APE is one of three types of insolvency proceedings that was available to Multicanal in
Argentina. The other two were a concurso preventivo, or reorganization proceeding, or a concurso liquidatorio, or
a liquidation proceeding. An APE may affect only unsecured claims and must be supported by a qualified
majority of impaired (i.e. affected) claims before commencement of the proceeding.
26. Id. at 499.
27. Id.
28. Multicanal I, supra note 21, at 387.
29. Id. at 388.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 391-92.
32. Canada S. Ry. Co. v. Gebhard, 109 U.S. 527 (1883).
33. Cunard S.S. Co. v. Salen Reefer Servs. AB, 773 E2d 452 (2d Cir. 1985).
34. Multicanal I, supra note 21, at 389-90.
35. Id. at 391, 393.
36. Id. at 392-93.
37. Id. at 388-89.
VOL. 39, NO. 2
INTERNATIONAL SECURED TRANSACTIONS AND INSOLVENCY 367
on changes to the APE that would, in the objector's view, harmonize the APE with the
TLA.
38
The bankruptcy court next decided in Multicanal II whether to grant recognition to the
APE under § 304, and whether to dismiss an involuntary petition against Multicanal.39 The
note holders urged three reasons why the APE proceeding contained such a degree of
dissimilarity with American bankruptcy laws that Multicanal's directors could not meet the
standards of § 304(c).4 The note holders first urged that, because the APE was a form of
a prepackaged reorganization that came under judicial review late in the approval process,
the APE lacked sufficient judicial oversight.4' The court's involvement was limited and
began after the directors completed solicitation of votes in favor of the reorganization.42
The bankruptcy court rejected this argument because the Argentinian procedures were
similar to the controls and degree of judicial oversight established in the United States for
solicitation and approval of prepackaged plans. 41 Section 304(c) does not require that for-
eign distribution schemes match the Bankruptcy Code. So the lack of the equivalents of a
good faith standard in forming and executing the plan standard, the lack of a creditors' best
interest test or an absolute priority rule, and the lack of avoidance actions to recover pref-
erences and fraudulent conveyances under APE law would not prevent ancillary relief.-
Second, the objector protested several aspects of the voting procedures used in gaining
approval of the APE plan.41 The objector complained that placing all note holders in one
group for voting purposes was unfair because the plan's treatment for the U.S. retail note
holders provided only a limited cash payout, whereas the other note holders could elect to
receive the same cash payout or new notes. 46 This argument failed because class voting
under the law of the home jurisdiction is not necessary under § 304 and the classification
and voting majority requirements of the APE system were closely in line with those of the
Bankruptcy Code.47 Although the APE also limited the payment election to holders voting
for the plan, the limitation did not amount to coercion in voting in the sense that due
process was denied to the objector.48 The objector contested confirmation in the Argentine
court and was denied relief.49
Voting procedures which were more cumbersome for "no" votes than "yes" votes and a
method for determining numerosity that differed from U.S. law were not grounds to deny
§ 304 relief5 0 The bankruptcy court expressed considerable concern about a criminal in-
vestigation launched by one of Multicanal's directors against several representatives of the
objector regarding its demands in the APE proceeding."' The threat of criminal prosecution
38. Id. at 392-94.
39. Multicanal II, supra note 21, at 491.
40. Id. at 503.
41. Id. at 503-04.
42. Id. at 504. -
43. Id. at 504-06.
44. Id. at 506, 508-09 (discussing 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(a)(3), 1129(a)(7), and 1129(b)).
45. Id. at 509.
46. Id. at 510.
47. Id. at 510-11.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 512.
50. Id. at 513-14.
51. Id. at 516.
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in a home court jurisdiction would be contrary to recognition under § 304.2 Accordingly,
the court required that Multicanal provide justification for the charges before the court
would enter a final order granting § 304 relief"
The objector found some additional success in its third argument against § 304 relief,
namely that the APE plan only provided for a limited cash distribution for retail note
holders, whereas all other holders could elect between the cash payment or from one of
two new series of notes.14 Multicanal's directors justified the disparate treatment as a means
to avoid compliance hurdles under U.S. securities law that would have been necessary upon
the issuance of the substitute notes." Regardless of the justification, the bankruptcy court
concluded that the differing treatment for the U.S. retail note holders constituted discrim-
ination outside of the boundaries of § 304 and was short of the standards required by
304(c)(1), (2) and (4).56 The bankruptcy court conditioned the entry of a final order on
§ 304 relief by requiring Multicanal to take steps to eliminate the discrimination.57
The bankruptcy court easily decided to dismiss the objector's involuntary proceeding.
The continuation of the involuntary case would be contrary to § 304's goals of avoiding
piecemeal distribution of the estate by allowing one group of creditors to gain an advan-
tage."8 The APE was nearing its conclusion and Multicanal's only asset in the United States
was a bank account containing $9,500. This account provided a questionable nexus to the
United States to allow the court to assert personal jurisdiction over the company.5 9
The bankruptcy court granted a preliminary injunction to last until the court received
the additional information concerning both the criminal proceedings commenced in Ar-
gentina, as well as the proposed remedy for the discrimination against the U.S. retail note
holders.60 The docket in the Southern District of New York reveals that the court entered
both a Final Order and a Memorandum Opinion on January 6, 2005, giving full force and
effect to the APE proceeding in the United States, granting a permanent injunction against
creditors who would take any action contrary to the APE proceeding, and dismissing the
involuntary proceeding.61
C. IN RE GLOBO COMUNICACoEs E PARTICIPACOES S.A.
In In re Globo Comunicacoes E Participacoes S.A., a group of creditors appealed an invol-
untary petition in district court that the bankruptcy court had previously dismissed.62 The
district court reversed the bankruptcy court's decision and remanded for further proceed-
ings.63 The putative debtor, referred to as "Globopar" by the district court, was a producer
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 516-17.
55. Id. at 517-18.
56. Id. at 518.
57. Id. at 520.
58. Id. at 521.
59. Id. at 522-23.
60. Id. at 523.
61. See Order Signed on 1/6/2005 Granting Section 304 Petition and Issuing Permanent Injunction and
Dismissing Involuntary Petition, In re Multicanal S.A., 314 B.R. 486 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004) (Nos. 04-10280,
04-10523).
62. See In re Globo Communicacoes E Participacoes S.A., 317 B.R. 235, 240 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
63. Id.
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of television programming and held the vast majority of its assets in Brazil. 64 The petitioning
creditors were among the holders of $750 million worth of bond debt.65 Globopar also
carried approximately $200 million of revolving credit with various U.S. and international
banks. 66 The Brazilian monetary devaluation in 2002 ultimately led to Globopar's default
on the debt.67 Globopar then entered into consensual restructuring negotiations with com-
mittees representing the bonds and the banks, but three bondholders later broke away and
filed the involuntary bankruptcy petition in the Southern District of New York on Decem-
ber 11, 2003.6
Globopar responded by contesting the court's jurisdiction and seeking the petition's
dismissal. 69 The bankruptcy court held a single hearing on February 19, 2004, and dismissed
the involuntary petition for several reasons, including the potential awkwardness of an
involuntary debtor in possession being left to administer an estate and the paucity of Glo-
bopar's U.S. assets and operations.7 0 The bankruptcy court also sustained Globopar's ar-
gument that the Brazilian courts would not recognize any judgments or orders issued in
the involuntary proceeding, thus preventing a U.S. court from assembling and managing
the debtor's assets.7 1 The bankruptcy court made two further determinations based on the
instruments governing the bond issue. First, the court concluded that Globopar's consent
to New York jurisdiction in the bond instruments extended only to lawsuits enforcing the
bond debt, and did not constitute consent to bankruptcy jurisdiction. 7" The court also
determined that certain "no action" clauses in the trust deeds associated with the bonds
rendered the petitioning creditors' involuntary petition an abuse of the bankruptcy process,
thus warranting dismissal under 11 U.S.C. § 105. 71 The bankruptcy court believed the in-
voluntary petition was an effort to circumvent the need to solicit the support of either
additional creditors or the trustee of the notes in order to enforce Globopar's obligations
under normal circumstances.
74
On appeal, the district court reversed the bankruptcy court's dismissal of the voluntary
petition and remanded the case for further proceedings.71 The district court disagreed with
virtually all of the conclusions reached by the bankruptcy court that led to dismissal pursuant
to § 105.76 First, the district court determined that the involuntary petitions did not con-
stitute an abuse of process that could be remedied under § 105 practice. 77 No abuse was
present because the involuntary petition was neither patently fraudulent nor clearly pro-
hibited by the Bankruptcy Code. 7 The "no action" clauses in the bond instruments, when
64. Id. at 240-41.
65. Id. at 242.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 242-43.
68. Id. at 243.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 244.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 244-45.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 235.
76. Id. at 259.
77. Id. at 247-48.
78. Id. at 247.
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read with the rest of the instruments' text, were ambiguous, and this ambiguity led the
bankruptcy court to err in its legal conclusion that the clauses affirmatively barred the filing
of the petition. 9 Instead the text of the "no action" clauses did not clearly prohibit the
petitioning creditors from filing the petition without the consent of the trustee of the notes
and any ambiguity should have been the subject of more evidence introduced into the
bankruptcy court's record. 0
The bankruptcy court also erred in determining, without holding any evidentiary pro-
ceedings, that Globopar could not qualify as an involuntary debtor. The record was incom-
plete as to the extent of Globopar's interest in a U.S. bank account containing $32,000, but
only a nominal amount of property is required under § 109 of the Bankruptcy Code for a
foreign corporation to qualify as a debtor; therefore, the bank account alone may have been
sufficient."' The district court also disagreed with the bankruptcy court's reticence at the
awkwardness of an involuntary debtor in possession by noting that § 303 specifically au-
thorizes petitioning creditors to commence involuntary proceedings under Chapter 11.82
The district court found little merit in the bankruptcy court's conclusion that a U.S.
bankruptcy court could not grant effective relief to Globopar's creditors because of both
the perceived inability to subject all of Globopar's assets to the U.S. bankruptcy court and
the anticipated lack of cooperation from Brazilian courts.8 3 The district court believed the
bankruptcy court reached this conclusion without having engaged in any "sustained analysis
regarding its ability to subject Globopar to personal jurisdiction in matters related to the
petition, and without evaluating whether it could in fact grant effective, if not perfect, relief
to creditors .... 84 Congress intended bankruptcy proceedings launched in the United
States to have global reach as evidenced by, for example, the inclusion of the debtor's
property "wherever located" as property of the estate under § 541.85
The extraterritorial extension of jurisdiction over a debtor's assets remains consistent
with due process under the U.S. Constitution once a bankruptcy court establishes in per-
sonam jurisdiction over the debtor.86 Contrary to the conclusions reached by the bankruptcy
court in Multicanal II, the district court concluded that the focus of the inquiry on whether
to extend the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction does not center on the current location of the
debtor's assets but instead examines the nature and extent of the debtor's contacts with the
U.S.87 Even if the bankruptcy court could neither extend its jurisdiction to all of Globopar's
creditors, or obtain the cooperation of the Brazilian court, the bankruptcy court was obli-
gated to exercise all of the jurisdiction given to it (aside from or before any considerations
of comity), 8 Accordingly, the district court included among its recommendations for re-
mand proceedings an instruction that the bankruptcy court examine the extent of Globo-
par's contacts with United States and whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over
79. Id. at 248.
80. Id. at 248-49.
81. Id. at 249.
82. Id. at 249-50.
83. Id. at 250.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 251.
87. Id. at 252.
88. Id. at 253.
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Globopar would be reasonable under the circumstances8 9 The jurisdictional determination
should include an examination of Globopar's consent to New York jurisdiction in the rele-
vant bond instruments. Despite the defects in the bankruptcy court's dismissal of the pe-
tition, the district court noted that the involuntary petition might be ripe for dismissal
either under abstention pursuant to § 305 or on the grounds of forum non conveniens, and
therefore directed the bankruptcy court to examine these aspects upon remand.90
D. IN RE YUKos OIL COMPANY; YuKos OIL COMPANY V. RUSSIAN FEDERATION ET AL.
As was widely reported in the media, in December of 2004, Yukos Oil Company faced
the imminent sale of its principal producing assets through a tax foreclosure sale scheduled
by the Russian government.9' Yukos filed, simultaneously, a voluntary Chapter 11 petition
in the Southern District of Texas and an adversary proceeding against both the Russian
Federation and several potential lenders believed to be prepared to finance the bidder(s)
who would be participating in the Russian tax sale.92 Yukos filed a motion seeking a tem-
porary restraining order (TRO) against the Russian Federation and the lenders to halt the
sale. Thus, the bankruptcy court conducted an emergency hearing on December 16, 2004.91
The bankruptcy court's opinion first examines whether jurisdiction existed for the bank-
ruptcy case. Yukos claimed the seizure and sale of its production assets was improper under
Russian law, and that it was entitled to the arbitration of its tax claims. 94 Yukos did not
request that the bankruptcy court adjudicate the underlying tax claims; instead, the main
basis of Yukos' TRO request was its need for an injunction lasting a few days so Yukos
could obtain authority from shareholders to commence a plenary proceeding in Russia. 9
Yukos claimed the Texas court possessed jurisdiction based on a $2 million Texas bank
account, a $6 million retainer held by its Texas lawyers, and the fact that 15 percent of the
company's shares were held by U.S. investors.96 Citing Aerovias and Globopar, the Court
recognized the low threshold of property located in the United States necessary for an
entity to qualify as a debtor under § 109 and thus obtain jurisdiction of the U.S. bankruptcy
court.97 The bankruptcy court concluded that it had jurisdiction to hear the adversary pro-
ceeding and the request for emergency injunctive relief.9s
The bankruptcy court concluded that Yukos had met the elements necessary for the entry
of a TRO. First, the bankruptcy court concluded that Yukos demonstrated a substantial
likelihood of success on the merits in its challenge to the validity of the assessed taxes, even
though the bankruptcy court recognized the "exceptional importance" of deference to an-
other state's judicial determinations.- Second, based on the testimony concerning the an-
89. Id. at 257.
90. Id. at 255-59.
91. In re Yukos Oil Co., 320 B.R.130, 132 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2004). A number of the pleadings from the
bankruptcy case and the adversary proceeding are available at www.yukosbankruptcy.com.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 133.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 132.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 133.
99. Id. at 136.
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ticipated bidding level in the tax auction, the court found a substantial threat of irreparable
injury due to the likelihood that their assets would be sold for far less than the true value.'0 °
Third, the court held that the public interest would not be disserved by delaying the tax
sale when compared to the value in seeking vindication of investor's rights and the sanctity
of international commercial law.' 0'
The tax sale ultimately proceeded despite the TRO, as was widely reported by the general
media. 1°2 The Yukos' main bankruptcy case was dismissed on February 24, 2005, and Yukos
sought to overturn the dismissal. 103 The motion practice and range of issues taking place
in the Yukos' bankruptcy and the adversary proceeding will surely be the subject of signifi-
cant future discussion.
M. Conclusion
The cases reported during 2004 stand as the potential foundations for the maintenance
of plenary proceedings in the United States for enterprises that largely conduct their opera-
tions and maintain most of their assets outside of U.S. borders. Such an exercise of juris-
diction lies at the outer boundaries of, or perhaps just beyond, the prevailing notion of
modified universalism. Although the Multicanal decisions demonstrate the limitations of
launching a plenary proceeding in the United States in direct competition to a similar
proceeding in a debtor's home jurisdiction, Aerovias and Globopar demonstrate the accep-
tance of a plenary proceeding in the United States. Aerovias and Globopar also show the
willingness of U.S. courts to maintain plenary proceedings in spite of concerns about the
effectiveness of the proceedings in the home jurisdiction as both courts overcame concerns
about the enforceability of the results of the Chapter 11 proceeding in the home jurisdic-
tion. Globopar and Yukos also show the limitations to the maintenance of a plenary proceed-
ing, considering the Globopar court's favorable discussion of the possibility that the United
States could be ruled to be an inconvenient forum and considering the practical limitations
of the reach of the injunction issued by the Yukos court and the ultimate dismissal of the
case. The Multicanal and Yukos cases are both the subject of appeals, and, in Globopar, the
bankruptcy court as of this writing has yet to issue an opinion on remand. If the debtors
and creditors continue to prosecute these cases on appeal, significant developments could
occur in 2005 concerning the reach of U.S. courts in serving as a central forum of global
insolvencies.
100. Id. at 137.
101. Id. at 137-38.
102. See generally, BBC News, Yukos Seeks Action an Sale (Dec. 22, 2004), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/
1/hi/business/4117271 stm; China Daily, Yukos Awaits Russia's Next Move After Mystery Sale (Dec. 20, 2004), at
http://www2.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-12/20/content-401786.htm; Elise Labbot, US Warns Russia
Over Yukos Sale (Dec. 23, 2004), at http://www.cnn.com/2004/BUSINTESS/12/22/russia.yukos.rosneft/index.htm.
103. See Memorandum Opinion, In re Yukos Oil Company, 320 B.R. 130 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2004) (Nos.
04-47742).
VOL. 39, NO. 2
